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Abstrat. We study mehanisms that permit program omponents to express role on-
straints on lients, fousing on programmati seurity mehanisms, whih permit aess
ontrols to be expressed, in situ, as part of the ode realizing basi funtionality. In this
setting, two questions immediately arise. (1) The user of a omponent faes the issue of
safety: is a partiular role suient to use the omponent? (2) The omponent designer
faes the dual issue of protetion: is a partiular role demanded in all exeution paths of
the omponent? We provide a formal alulus and stati analysis to answer both questions.
1. Introdution
This paper addresses programmati seurity mehanisms as realized in systems suh as
Java Authentiation and Authorization Servie (jaas) and .net. These systems enable two
forms of aess ontrol mehanisms
1
. First, they permit delarative aess ontrol to desribe
seurity speiations that are orthogonal and separate from desriptions of funtionality,
e.g., in an interfae I, a delarative aess ontrol mehanism ould require the aller to
possess a minimum set of rights. While oneptually elegant, suh speiations do not
diretly permit the enforement of aess ontrol that is sensitive to the ontrol and dataow
of the ode implementing the funtionality  onsider for example history sensitive seurity
poliies that require runtime monitoring of relevant events. Consequently, jaas and .net
also inlude programmati mehanisms that permit aess ontrol ode to be intertwined
with funtionality ode, e.g., in the ode of a omponent implementing interfae I. On the
one hand, suh programmati mehanisms permit the diret expression of aess ontrol
poliies. However, the programmati approah leads to the ommingling of the oneptually
separate onerns of seurity and funtionality.
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In this paper, we disuss only authorization mehanisms, ignoring the authentiation mehanisms that
are also part of these infrastrutures.
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There is extensive literature on poliy languages to speify and implement poliies
(e.g., [16, 28, 15, 5, 29, 13℄ to name but a few). This researh studies seurity poliies
as separate and orthogonal additions to omponent ode, and is thus foused on delarative
seurity in the parlane of jaas/.net.
In ontrast, we study programmati seurity mehanisms. Our motivation is to extrat
the seurity guarantees provided by aess ontrol ode whih has been written inline with
omponent ode. We address this issue from two viewpoints:
• The user of a omponent faes the issue of safety: is a partiular set of rights suient to
use the omponent? (ie. with that set of rights, there is no possible exeution path that
would fail a seurity hek. Furthermore, any greater set of rights will also be allowed to
use the omponent)
• The omponent designer faes the dual issue of protetion: is a partiular set of rights
demanded in all exeution paths of the omponent? (ie. every exeution path requires
that set of rights. Furthermore, any lesser set of rights will not be allowed to use the
omponent)
The main ontribution of this paper is separate stati analyses to alulate approximations
to these two questions. An approximate answer to the rst question is a set of rights,
perhaps bigger than neessary, that is suient to use the omponent. On the other hand,
an approximate answer to the seond question, is a set of rights, perhaps smaller than what
is atually enfored, that is neessary to use the omponent.
1.1. An overview of our tehnial ontributions. There is extensive literature on Role-
Based Aess-Control (rba) models inluding nist standards for rba [26, 12℄; see [11℄ for
a textbook survey. The main motivation for rba, in software arhitetures (e.g., [22, 21℄)
and frameworks suh as jaas/.net, is that it enables the enforement of seurity poliies
at a granularity demanded by the appliation. In these examples, rba allows permissions
to be de-oupled from users: Roles are the unit of administration for users and permissions
are assigned to roles. Roles are often arranged in a hierarhy for suint representation
of the mapping of permissions. Component programmers design ode in terms of a stati
olletion of roles. When the appliation is deployed, administrators map the roles dened
in the appliation to users in the partiular domain.
In this paper, we study a lambda alulus enrihed with primitives for aess ontrol,
dubbed λ-RBAC. The underlying lambda alulus serves as an abstration of the ambient
programming framework in a real system. We draw inspiration from the programming
idioms in jaas and .net, to determine the expressiveness required for the aess ontrol
mehanisms. In a sequene of .net examples
2
, losely based on [18℄, we give the reader a
avor of the basi programming idioms.
Example 1 ( [18℄). In the .net Framework lr, every thread has a Prinipal objet that
arries its role. This Prinipal objet an be viewed as representing the user exeuting
the thread. In programming, it often needs to be determined whether a spei Prinipal
objet belongs to a familiar role. The ode performs heks by making a seurity all for
a PrinipalPermission objet. The PrinipalPermission lass denotes the role that a
spei prinipal needs to math. At the time of a seurity hek, the lr heks whether
2
In order to minimize the syntati barrage on the unsuspeting reader, our examples to illustrate the
features are drawn solely from the .net programming domain. At the level of our disussion, there are no
real distintions between jaas and .net seurity servies.
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the role of the Prinipal objet of the aller mathes the role of the PrinipalPermission
objet being requested. If the role values of the two objets do not math, an exeption is
raised. The following ode snippet illustrates the issues:
PrinipalPermission usrPerm =
new PrinipalPermission (null,"Manager");
usrPerm.Demand()
If the urrent thread is assoiated with a prinipal that has the the role of manager, the
PrinipalPermission objets are reated and seurity aess is given as required. If the
redentials are not valid, a seurity exeption is raised.
In this vein, the intuitive operation of λ-RBAC is as follows. λ-RBAC program exeution
takes plae in the ontext of a role, say r, whih an be viewed onretely as a set of
permissions. The set of roles used in a program is stati: we do not allow the dynami
reation of roles. λ-RBAC supports run-time operations to reate objets (i.e. higher-order
funtions) that are wrapped with proteting roles. The use of suh guarded objets is
failitated by operations that hek that the role-ontext r is at least as strong as the
guarding role: an exeption is raised if the hek fails.
The next example illustrates that boolean ombinations of roles are permitted in pro-
grams. In lassial rba terms, this is abstrated by a lattie or boolean struture on
roles.
Example 2 ( [18℄). The Unionmethod of the PrinipalPermission lass ombines multiple
PrinipalPermission objets. The following ode represents a seurity hek that sueeds
only if the Prinipal objet represents a user in the CourseAdmin or BudgetManager roles:
PrinipalPermission Perm1 =
new PrinipalPermission (null,"CourseAdmin");
PrinipalPermission Perm2 =
new PrinipalPermission(null,"BudgetManager');
// Demand at least one of the roles using Union
perm1.Union (perm2).Demand ()
Similarly, there is an Interset method to represent a join operation in the role lattie.
In λ-RBAC, we assume that roles form a lattie: abstrating the onrete union/inter-
setion operations of these examples. In the onrete view of a role as a set of permissions,
role ordering is given by supersets, ie. a role is stronger than another role if it has more
permissions; join of roles orresponds to the union of the sets of permissions and meet of
roles orresponds to the intersetion of the sets of permissions. Some of our results assume
that the lattie is boolean, i.e. the lattie has a negation operation. In the onrete view
of the motivating examples, the negation operation is interpreted by set omplement with
respet to a maximum olletion of permissions
Our study is parametri on the underlying role lattie.
The key operation in suh programming is rights modulation. From a programming
viewpoint, it is onvenient, indeed sometimes required, for an appliation to operate under
the guise of dierent users at dierent times. Rights modulation of ourse omes in two
avors: rights weakening is overall a safe operation, sine the aller hooses to exeute with
fewer rights. On the other hand, rights ampliation is learly a more dangerous operation.
In the .net framework, rights modulation is ahieved via a tehnique alled impersonation.
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Example 3. Impersonation of an aount is ahieved using the aount's token, as shown
in the following ode snippet:
WindowsIdentity stIdentity = new WindowsIdentity (StToken);
// StToken is the token assoiated with the Windows at being impersonated
WindowsImpersonationContext stImp = stIdentity.Impersonate();
// now operating under the new identity
stImp.Undo(); // revert bak
λ-RBAC has ombinators to perform soped rights weakening and ampliation.
We demonstrate the expressiveness of λ-RBAC by building a range of useful ombinators
and a variety of small illustrative examples. We disuss type systems to perform the two
analyses alluded to earlier: (a) an analysis to detet and remove unneessary role-heks in
a piee of ode for a aller at a suiently high role, and (b) an analysis to determine the
(maximal) role that is guaranteed to be required by a piee of ode. The latter analysis a-
quires partiular value in the presene of rights modulation. For both we prove preservation
and progress properties.
1.2. Related work. Our paper falls into the broad area of researh enlarging the sope of
foundational, language-based seurity methods (see [27, 19, 3℄ for surveys).
Our work is lose in spirit, if not in tehnial development, to edit automata [16℄, whih
use aspets to avoid the expliit intermingling of seurity and baseline ode.
The papers that are most diretly relevant to the urrent paper are those of Braghin,
Gorla and Sassone [7℄ and Compagnoni, Garalda and Gunter [10℄. [7℄ presents the rst on-
urrent alulus with a notion of rba, whereas [10℄'s language enables privileges depending
upon loation.
Both these papers start o with a mobile proess-based omputational model. Both al-
uli have primitives to ativate and deativate roles: these roles are used to prevent undesired
mobility and/or ommuniation, and are similar to the primitives for role restrition and
ampliation in this paper. The ambient proess alulus framework of these papers pro-
vides a diret representation of the sessions of rba in ontrast, our sequential alulus
is best thought of as modeling a single session.
[7, 10℄ develop type systems to provide guarantees about the minimal role required for
exeution to be suessful  our rst type system oupies the same oneptual spae as this
stati analysis. However, our seond type system that alulates minimum aess ontrols
does not seem to have an analogue in these papers.
More globally, our paper has been inuened by the desire to serve loosely as a metalan-
guage for programming rba mehanisms in examples suh as the jaas/.net frameworks.
Thus, our treatment internalizes rights ampliation by program ombinators and the am-
plify role onstrutor in role latties. In ontrast, the above papers use external  i.e.
not part of the proess language  mehanisms (namely, user poliies in [10℄, and rba-
shemes in [7℄) to enfore ontrol on rights ativation. We expet that our ideas an be
adapted to the proess aluli framework. In future work, we also hope to integrate the
powerful bisimulation priniples of these papers.
Our paper deals with aess ontrol, so the extensive work on information ow, e.g.,
see [24℄ for a survey, is not diretly relevant. However, we note that rights ampliation
plays the same role in λ-RBAC that delassiation and delimited release [9, 25, 20℄ plays in
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the ontext of information ow; namely that of permitting aess that would not have been
possible otherwise. In addition, by supporting the internalizing of the ability to amplify ode
rights into the role lattie, our system permits aess ontrol ode to atively partiipate in
managing rights ampliation.
1.3. Rest of the paper. We present the language in Setion 2, the type system in Se-
tion 3 and illustrate its expressiveness with examples in Setion 4. We disuss methods for
ontrolling rights ampliation in Setion 5. Setion 6 provides proofs of the theorems from
Setion 3.
2. The Language
After a disussion of roles, we present an overview of the language design. The remaining
subsetions present the formal syntax, evaluation semantis, typing system, and some simple
examples.
2.1. Roles. The language of roles is built up from role onstrutors. The hoie of role
onstrutors is appliation dependent, but must inlude the lattie onstrutors disussed
below. Eah role onstrutor, κ, has an assoiated arity, arity(κ). Roles AE have the form
κ(A1, . . . , An).
We require that roles form a boolean lattie; that is, the set of onstrutors must inlude
the nullary onstrutors 0 and 1, binary onstrutors ⊔ and ⊓ (written inx), and unary
onstrutor
⋆
(written postx). 0 is the least element of the role lattie. 1 is the greatest
element. ⊓ and ⊔ are idempotent, ommutative, assoiative, and mutually distributive meet
and join operations respetively.
⋆
is the omplement operator.
A role may be thought of as a set of permissions. Under this interpretation, 0 is the
empty set, while 1 is the set of all permissions.
The syntax of terms uses role modiers, ρ, whih may be of the form ↑A or ↓A. We use
role modiers as funtions from roles to roles, with ρLA M dened as follows:
↑ALB M = A ⊔B ↓ALB M = A ⊓B
In summary, the syntax of roles is as follows.
κ ::= 0 | 1 | ⊔ | ⊓ | ⋆ | · · · Role onstrutors
AE ::= κ(A1, . . . , An) Roles
ρ ::= ↑A | ↓A Role modiers
Throughout the paper, we assume that all roles (and therefore all types) are well-formed,
in the sense that role onstrutors have the orret number of arguments.
The semantis of roles is dened by the relation A
.
= B stating that A and B are
provably equivalent. In addition to any appliation-spei axioms, we assume the standard
axioms of boolean algebra. We say that A dominates B (notation A > B) if A
.
= A ⊔ B
(equivalently B
.
= A ⊓B) is derivable. Thus we an onlude 1 > A ⊔B > A > A ⊓B > 0,
for any A, B.
The role modier ↓A reates a weaker role (loser to 0), thus we refer to it as a restrition.
Dually, the modier ↑A reates a stronger role (loser to 1), and thus we refer to it as an
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ampliation. While this ordering follows that of the nist rba standard [12℄, it is dual to
the normal logial reading; it may be helpful to keep in mind that, viewed as a logi, 1 is
false, 0 is true, ⊔ is and, ⊓ is or and > is implies.
2.2. Language overview. Our goal is to apture the essene of role-based systems, where
roles are used to regulate the interation of omponents of the system. We have hosen to
base our language on Moggi's monadi metalanguage beause it is simple and well under-
stood, yet rih enough to apture the key onepts. By design, the monadi metalanguage is
partiularly well suited to studying omputational side eets (or simply eets), whih are
entral to our work. (We expet that our ideas an be adapted to both proess and objet
aluli.)
The omponents in the monadi metalanguage are terms and the ontexts that use
them. To protet terms, we introdue guards of the form {A}[M℄, whih an only be
disharged by a ontext whose role dominates A. The notion of ontext role is formalized in
the denition of evaluation, where A ⊲ M → N indiates that ontext role A is suient to
redue M to N . The term check M disharges the guard on M . The evaluation rule allows
A ⊲ check {B}[M℄ → [M℄ only if A > B.
The ontext role may vary during evaluation: given ontext role A, the term ρ(M)
evaluates M with ontext role ρLA M. Thus, when ↓B(M) is evaluated with ontext role A,
M is evaluated with ontext role A⊓B. A ontext may protet itself from a term by plaing
the use of the term in suh a restrited ontext. (The syntax enfores a stak disipline on
role modiers.) By ombining upwards and downwards modiers, ode may assume any role
and thus irumvent an intended poliy. We address this issue in Setion 5.
These onstruts are suient to allow protetion for both terms and ontexts: terms
an be proteted from ontexts using guards, and ontexts an be proteted from terms
using (restritive) role modiers.
2.3. Syntax. Let x, y, z, f , g range over variable names, and let bv range over base values.
Our presentation is abstrat with respet to base values; we use the types String, Int and
Unit (with value unit) in examples. We use the standard enodings of booleans and pairs
(see Example 14). The syntax of values and terms are as follows.
V,U,W ::= M,N,L ::= Values; Terms
bv | x V Base Value
λx.M M N | fixM Abstration
{A}[M℄ check M Guard
[M℄ let x=M;N Computation
ρ(M) Role Modier
Notation. In examples, we write A(M) to abbreviate ↓0(↑A(M)), whih exeutes M at
exatly role A.
The variable x is bound in the value λx.M  (with sopeM) and in the term  let x=M;
N  (with sope N). If x does not appear free in M , we abbreviate λx.M  as λ.M .
Similarly, if x does not appear free in N , we abbreviate  let x= M;N  as M;N . We
identify syntax up to renaming of bound variables and write N{x := M} for the apture-
avoiding substitution of M for x in N .
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In the presentation of the syntax above, we have paired the onstrutors on values
on the left with the destrutors on omputations on the right. For example, the monadi
metalanguage distinguishes 2 from [2℄ and [1+1℄: the former is an integer, whereas the
latter are omputations that, when bound, produe an integer. The omputation value [M℄
must be disharged in a binding ontext  see the redution rule for let, below. Similarly,
the funtion value λx.M must be disharged by appliation; in the redution semantis
that follows, evaluation proeeds in an appliation till the term in funtion position redues
to a lambda abstration. {A}[M℄ onstruts a guarded value; the assoiated destrutor is
check .
The monadi metalanguage distinguishes omputations from the values they produe
and treats omputations as rst lass entities. (Any term may be treated as a value via the
unit onstrutor [M℄.) Both appliation and the let onstrut result in omputations; how-
ever, the way that they handle their arguments is dierent. The appliation (λx.N) [M℄
results in N{x := [M℄}, whereas the binding  let x= [M℄;M  results in N{x :=M}.
2.4. Evaluation and role error. The small-step evaluation relation A ⊲ M → M ′ is
dened indutively by the following redution and ontext rules.
(r-app)
A ⊲ (λx.M) N →M{x := N}
(-app)
A ⊲ M →M ′
A ⊲ M N →M ′ N
(r-fix)
A ⊲ fix (λx.M) →M{x := fix (λx.M)}
(-fix)
A ⊲ M →M ′
A ⊲ fixM → fixM ′
(r-hk)
A ⊲ check {B}[M℄→ [M℄
A > B
(-hk)
A ⊲ M →M ′
A ⊲ check M → check M ′
(r-bind)
A ⊲ let x= [M℄;N → N{x :=M}
(-bind)
A ⊲ M →M ′
A ⊲ let x=M;N → let x=M ′;N
(r-mod)
A ⊲ ρ(V )→ V
(-mod)
ρLA M ⊲ M →M ′
A ⊲ ρ(M)→ ρ(M ′)
The rules r/-app for appliation, r/-fix for xed points and r/-bind for let are
standard. r-hk ensures that the ontext role is suient before disharging the relevant
guard. -mod modies the ontext role until the relevant term is redued to a value, at
whih point r-mod disards the modier.
The evaluation semantis is designed to ensure a role-monotoniity property. Inreasing
the available role-ontext annot invalidate transitions, it an only enable more evolution.
Lemma 4. If B ⊲ M →M ′ and A > B then A ⊲ M →M ′.
Proof. (Sketh) The ontext role is used only in r-hk. Result follows by indution on the
evaluation judgement.
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Via a series of onseutive small steps, the nal value for the program an be determined.
Suessful termination is written A ⊲ M ։ V whih indiates that A is authorized to run
the program M to ompletion, with result V . Viewed as a role-indexed relation on terms,
։ is reexive and transitive.
Denition 5. (a) M0 evaluates to Mn at A (notation A ⊲ M0 ։ Mn) if there exist terms
Mi suh that A ⊲ Mi → Mi+1, for all i (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1). (b) M diverges at A (notation
A ⊲ M →ω) if there exist terms Mi suh that A ⊲ Mi →Mi+1, for all i ∈ N.
Evaluation an fail beause a term diverges, beause a destrutor is given a value of the
wrong shape, or beause an inadequate role is provided at some point in the omputation.
We refer to the latter as a role error (notation A ⊲ M  err), dened indutively as follows.
A ⊲ check {B}[M℄  err
A 6> B
ρLA M ⊲ M  err
A ⊲ ρ(M)  err
A ⊲ M  err
A ⊲ M N  err
A ⊲ M  err
A ⊲ fixM  err
A ⊲ M  err
A ⊲ let x=M;N  err
A ⊲ M  err
A ⊲ check M  err
Example 6. Reall from Setion 2.3 that B(M) abbreviates ↓0(↑B(M)), and dene
test<B> as follows3.
test<B> △= check {B}[unit℄
test<B> is a omputation that requires ontext role B to evaluate. For example, ↓B⋆(test<B>)
produes a role error in any ontext, sine ↓B⋆ restrits any role-ontext to the negation of
the role B.
Example 7. We now illustrate how terms an provide roles for themselves. Consider the
following guarded funtion:
from<A,B> △= {A}[λy.B(y)℄
from<A,B> is a guarded value that may only be disharged by A, resulting in a funtion
that runs any omputation at B. Let test<B> △= check {B}[unit℄. No matter what the
relationship is between A and B, the following evaluation sueeds:
A ⊲ let z= check from<A,B>; z test<B>։ B(test<B>)։ [unit℄
from<A,B> is far too powerful to be useful. After the A-guard is disharged, the resulting
funtion will run any ode at role B. One an provide spei ode, of ourse, as in λy.B(M).
Suh funtions are inherently dangerous and therefore it is desirable onstrain the way in
whih suh funtions are reated. The essential idea is to attah suitable heks to a funtion
suh as λg.λy.B(g y), whih takes a non-privileged funtion and runs it under B. There
are a number of subtleties to onsider in providing a general purpose infrastruture to reate
terms with rights ampliation. When should the guard be heked? What funtions should
be allowed to run, and in what ontext? In Example 21, we disuss the treatment of these
issues using the Domain and Type Enforement aess ontrol mehanism.
3
We do not address parametriity here; the brakets in the names test<B> and from<A,B> are merely
suggestive.
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3. Typing
We present two typing systems that ontrol role errors in addition to shape errors.
The rst typing system determines a ontext role suient to avoid role errors; that
is, with this role, there is no possible exeution path that auses a role error. This system
enables the removal of unneessary role-heks in a piee of ode for a aller at a suiently
high role.
The seond system determines a ontext role neessary to avoid role errors; that is, any
role that does not dominate this role will ause every exeution path to result in a role error.
Stated dierently, the seond system alulates the role that is heked and tested on every
exeution path and thus determines the amount of protetion that is enfored by the allee.
Tehnially, the two systems dier primarily in their notions of subtyping. In the absene
of subtyping, the typing system determines a ontext role that is both neessary and suient
to exeute a term without role errors.
Beause it learly indiates the point at whih omputation is performed, the monadi
metalanguage is attrative for reasoning about seurity properties, whih we understand as
omputational eets. The type [T ] is the type of omputations of type T . We extend the
omputation type [T ] to inlude an eet that indiates the guards that are disharged during
evaluation of a term. Thus the term check {A}[1+1℄ has type 〈A〉[Int]  this type indiates
that the redution of the term to a value (at type Int) requires A. Guarded values inhabit
types of the form {A}[T ]  this type indiates the protetion of A around an underlying
value at type T . These may be disharged with a check, resulting in a term inhabiting the
omputation type 〈A〉[T ].
The syntax of types is given below, with the onstrutors and destrutors at eah type
realled from Setion 2.3.
T, S ::= V,U,W ::= M,N,L ::= Types; Values; Terms
Base bv | x V Base Value
T  S λx.M M N | fixM Abstration
{A}[T ] {A}[M℄ check M Guard
〈A〉[T ] [M℄ let x=M;N Computation
ρ(M) Role Modier
3.1. Subtyping. The judgments of the subtyping and typing relations are indexed by α
whih ranges over {1, 2}. The subtyping relation for 〈A〉[T ] reets the dierene between
the two type systems.
If role A sues to enable a term to evaluate without role errors, then any higher role
ontext also avoids role errors (using Lemma 4). This explains the subtyping rule for the
rst type system  in partiular, ⊢
1
〈A〉[T ]
<
: 〈1〉[T ], reeting the fat that the top role is
suient to run any omputation.
On the other hand, if a role A of the role-ontext is heked and tested on every exeution
path of a term, then so is any smaller role. This explains the subtyping rule for the rst
type system  in partiular, ⊢
2
〈A〉[T ]
<
: 〈0〉[T ], reeting the fat that the bottom role is
vauously heked in any omputation.
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⊢α Base <: Base
⊢α T <: T
′
⊢α {A}[T ] <: {A
′}[T ′]
if α = 1 then A′ > A
if α = 2 then A > A′
⊢α T
′
<
: T ⊢α S <: S
′
⊢α T  S <: T
′  S′
⊢α T <: T
′
⊢α 〈A〉[T ] <: 〈A
′〉[T ′]
if α = 1 then A′ > A
if α = 2 then A > A′
Lemma 8. The relations ⊢α T <: S are reexive and transitive.
3.2. Type systems. Typing is dened using environments. An environment,
Γ ::= x
1
:T
1
, . . . , xn:Tn
is a nite partial map from variables to types.
As usual, there is one typing rule for eah syntati form plus the rule t-sub for sub-
sumption, whih allows the use of subtyping. Upwards and downwards role modiers have
separate rules, disussed below. The typing rules for the two systems dier only in their no-
tion of subtyping and in the side ondition on t-mod-dn; we disuss the latter in Example 15.
(t-base)
Γ ⊢α bv : Base
(t-var)
Γ, x:T ,Γ′ ⊢α x : T
(t-sub)
Γ ⊢α M : T
Γ ⊢α M : T
′
⊢α T <: T
′
(t-abs)
Γ, x:T ⊢α M : S
Γ ⊢α λx.M : T  S
x /∈ dom(Γ)
(t-app)
Γ ⊢α M : T  S Γ ⊢α N : T
Γ ⊢α M N : S
(t-fix)
Γ ⊢α M : T  T
Γ ⊢α fixM : T
(t-grd)
Γ ⊢α M : T
Γ ⊢α {A}[M℄ : {A}[T ]
(t-hk)
Γ ⊢α M : {A}[T ]
Γ ⊢α check M : 〈A〉[T ]
(t-unit)
Γ ⊢α M : T
Γ ⊢α [M℄ : 〈0〉[T ]
(t-bind)
Γ ⊢α M : 〈A〉[T ] Γ, x:T ⊢α N : 〈B〉[S]
Γ ⊢α let x=M;N : 〈A ⊔B〉[S]
x /∈ dom(Γ)
(t-mod-up)
Γ ⊢α M : 〈B〉[T ]
Γ ⊢α ↑A(M) : 〈B ⊓A
⋆〉[T ]
(t-mod-dn)
Γ ⊢α M : 〈B〉[T ]
Γ ⊢α ↓A(M) : 〈B〉[T ]
if α = 1 then A > B
The rules t-base, t-var, t-sub, t-abs, t-app and t-fix are standard. For example,
the identity funtion has the expeted typing, ⊢α λx.x : T  T, for any T . Nonterminating
omputations an also be typed; for example, ⊢α fix (λx.x) : T, for any T .
Any term may be injeted into a omputation type at the least role using t-unit. Thus,
in the light of the earlier disussion on subtyping, if ⊢α M : T then, in the rst system, [M℄
inhabits 〈A〉[T ] for every role A; in the seond system, the term inhabits only type 〈0〉[T ],
indiating that no heks are required to suessfully evaluate the value [M℄.
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Computations may be ombined using t-bind
4
. If M inhabits 〈A〉[T ] and N inhabits
〈B〉[S], then M;N  inhabits 〈A ⊔B〉[S]. More generally, we an dedue:
⊢α λx. let x
′
= x;x′ : 〈A〉[〈B〉[T ]] 〈A ⊔B〉[T ]
In the rst type system, this rule is motivated by noting that the role ontext A⊔B sues
to suessfully avoid role errors in the ombined omputation if A (resp. B) sues for M
(resp. N). For the seond type system, onsider a role C that is not bigger than A ⊔B 
thus C is not bigger than at least one of A,B. If it is not greater than A, by assumption on
typing of M , every omputation path of M in role ontext C leads to a role-error. Similarly
for B. Thus, in role ontext C, every omputation path in the ombined omputation
leads to a role error. Furthermore, using the earlier subtyping disussion, the sequene also
inhabits 〈1〉[S] in the rst system and 〈0〉[S] in the seond.
The rule t-grd types basi values with their protetion level. The higher-order version
of {A}[℄ has the natural typing:
⊢α λx.{A}[x℄ : T  {A}[T ]
Reall that in the transition relation, check {A}[N℄ heks the role ontext against A. The
typing rule t-hk mirrors this behavior by onverting the protetion level of values into
onstraints on role ontexts. For example, we have the typing:
⊢α λx.check x : {A}[T ] 〈A〉[T ]
In the speial ase of typing Γ ⊢α check {A}[N℄ : 〈A〉[T ], we an further justify in the two
systems as follows. In terms of the rst type system, the role ontext passes this hek if it
is at least A. In terms of the seond type system, any role ontext that does not inlude A
will ause a role-error.
Role modiers are treated by separate rules for upwards and downwards modiers.
The rule for t-mod-up is justied for the rst type system as follows. Under assumption
that B sues to evaluate M without role-errors, onsider evaluation of ↑A(M) in role
ontext B ⊓A⋆. This term ontributes A to role ontext yielding A⊔ (B ⊓A⋆) = (A⊔B)⊓
(A ⊔A⋆) = B for the evaluation of M . For the seond type system, assume that if a role is
not greater than B, then the evaluation of N leads to a role error. Consider the evaluation
of ↑A(M) in a role ontext C that does not exeed B ⊓ A⋆. Then, the evaluation of M
proeeds in role ontext C ⊔ A whih does not exeed B and hene auses a role error by
assumption.
The rule for t-mod-dn is justied for the rst type system as follows. Under assumption
that B sues to evaluateM without role-errors, and A is greater than B onsider evaluation
of ↓A(M) in role ontext B. This term alters role-ontext B to B⊓A = B for the evaluation
of M , whih sues. For the seond type system, assume that if a role is not greater than
B, then the evaluation of N leads to a role error. Consider the evaluation of ↓A(M) in a
role ontext C that does not exeed B. Then, C ⊓A ertainly does not exeed B and so the
evaluation of M auses a role error by assumption.
Example 16 and Example 15 disuss alternate presentations for the rules of typing for
the role modiers.
In stating the results, we distinguish omputations from other types. Lemma 10 holds
trivially from the denitions.
4
The distintion between our system and dependeny-based systems an be see in t-bind, whih in d
[1, 2, 30℄ states that ⊢ let x=M;N : 〈B〉[S] if B > A, where ⊢M : 〈A〉[T ] and x:T ⊢ N : 〈B〉[S].
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Denition 9. Role A dominates type T (notation A ≥ T ) if T is not a omputation type,
or T is a omputation type 〈B〉[S] and A > B.
Lemma 10. (a) If A > B and B ≥ T then A ≥ T . (b) If ⊢
1
T
<
: S and A ≥ S then A ≥ T .
() If ⊢
2
T
<
: S and A ≥ T then A ≥ S.
The following theorems formalize the guarantees provided by the two systems. The
proofs may be found in Setion 6.
Theorem 11. If ⊢
1
M : T and A ≥ T , then either A ⊲ M →ω or A ⊲ M ։ V for some V .
Theorem 12. If ⊢
2
M : T and A 6≥ T , then either A ⊲ M →ω or there exists N suh that
A ⊲ M ։ N and A ⊲ N  err.
For the rst system, we have a standard type-safety theorem. For the seond system,
suh a safety theorem does not hold; for example ⊢
2
check {1}[unit℄ : 〈1〉[Unit] and 1 ⊲
check {1}[unit℄ → [unit℄ but 6⊢
2
[unit℄ : 〈1〉[Unit]. Instead Theorem 12 states that a term
run with an insuient ontext role is guaranteed either to diverge or to produe a role
error.
3.3. Simple examples.
Example 13. We illustrate ombinators of the language with some simple funtions. The
identity funtion may be given its usual type:
⊢α λx.x : T  T
The unit of omputation an be used to reate a omputation from any value:
⊢α λx.[x℄ : T  〈0〉[T]
The let onstrut evaluates a omputation. In this following example, the result of the
omputation x′ must itself be a omputation beause it is returned as the result of the
funtion:
⊢α λx. let x
′
= x; x′ : 〈A〉[〈B〉[T]] 〈A ⊔ B〉[T]
The guard onstrut reates a guarded term:
⊢α λx.{A}[x℄ : T {A}[T]
The hek onstrut disharges a guard, resulting in a omputation:
⊢α λx.check x : {A}[T] 〈A〉[T]
The upwards role modier redues the role required by a omputation.
⊢α λx.↑B(x) : 〈A〉[T] 〈A ⊓ B⋆〉[T]
The rst typing system requires that any omputation performed in the ontext of a down-
ward role modier ↓B() must not require more than role B:
⊢α λx.↓B(x) : 〈A〉[T] 〈A〉[T] (where B > A if α = 1)
In the rst type system, the last two judgments may be generalized as follows:
⊢
1
λx.ρ(x) : 〈ρLA M〉[T] 〈A〉[T]
Thus a role modier may be seen as transforming a omputation that requires the modier
into one that does not. For further disussion see Example 16.
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Example 14 (Booleans). The Churh Booleans, tru
△
= λt.λf. t and fls △= λt.λf. f, illustrate
the use of subtyping. In the two systems, these may be given the following types.
Bool
1
△
= 〈A〉[T ] 〈B〉[T ] 〈A ⊔B〉[T ] ⊢
1
tru, fls : Bool
1
Bool
2
△
= 〈A〉[T ] 〈B〉[T ] 〈A ⊓B〉[T ] ⊢
2
tru, fls : Bool
2
These types reet the intuitions underlying the two type systems. The rst type system
reets a maximum over all paths typing, whereas the seond reets a minimum over all
paths typing. The onditional may be interpreted using the following derived rules.
Γ ⊢
1
L : Bool
1
Γ ⊢
1
M : 〈A〉[T ] Γ ⊢
1
N : 〈B〉[T ]
Γ ⊢
1
if L thenM else N : 〈A ⊔B〉[T ]
Γ ⊢
2
L : Bool
2
Γ ⊢
2
M : 〈A〉[T ] Γ ⊢
2
N : 〈B〉[T ]
Γ ⊢
2
if L thenM else N : 〈A ⊓B〉[T ]

Example 15 (t-mod-dn). The side ondition on t-mod-dn does not eet typability in
seond typing system, but may unneessarily derease the auray of the analysis, as an
be seen from the following onrete example.
Let M,N be terms of type 〈B〉[T ].
Γ ⊢α M : 〈B〉[T ]
Γ ⊢α M : 〈A ⊓B〉[T ]
(t-sub)
Γ ⊢α ↓A(M) : 〈A ⊓B〉[T ]
(t-mod-dn)
With the side ondition, the term let x= ↓A(M);N would have to be given a type of the
form 〈A⊓B〉[T ], even though both M and N have type 〈B〉[T ]. Without the side ondition,
the better type 〈B〉[T ] may be given to the entire let expression.
Example 16 (Alternative rule for role modiers). In the rst typing system, t-mod-up
and t-mod-dn may be replaed with the following rule, whih we all t-mod-*.
Γ ⊢
1
M : 〈ρLB M〉[T ]
Γ ⊢
1
ρ(M) : 〈B〉[T ]
Consider ρ = ↑A. Beause C > (A ⊔ C) ⊓A⋆, the following are equivalent.
Γ ⊢
1
M : 〈A ⊔ C〉[T ]
Γ ⊢
1
↑A(M) : 〈C〉[T ]
(t-mod-*)
Γ ⊢
1
M : 〈A ⊔ C〉[T ]
Γ ⊢
1
↑A(M) : 〈(A ⊔ C) ⊓A⋆〉[T ]
(t-mod-up)
Γ ⊢
1
↑A(M) : 〈C〉[T ]
(t-sub)
Beause (D ⊓A⋆) ⊔A > D, the following are equivalent.
Γ ⊢
1
M : 〈D〉[T ]
Γ ⊢
1
M : 〈(D ⊓A⋆) ⊔A〉[T ]
(t-sub)
Γ ⊢
1
↑A(M) : 〈D ⊓A⋆〉[T ]
(t-mod-*)
Γ ⊢
1
M : 〈D〉[T ]
Γ ⊢
1
↑A(M) : 〈D ⊓A⋆〉[T ]
(t-mod-up)
Consider ρ = ↓A. Beause A > A ⊓ C and C > A ⊓ C, the following are equivalent.
Γ ⊢
1
M : 〈A ⊓ C〉[T ]
Γ ⊢
1
↓A(M) : 〈C〉[T ]
(t-mod-*)
Γ ⊢
1
M : 〈A ⊓ C〉[T ]
Γ ⊢
1
↓A(M) : 〈A ⊓ C〉[T ]
(t-mod-dn)
Γ ⊢
1
↓A(M) : 〈C〉[T ]
(t-sub)
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Suppose A > D. Then D ⊓A > D, and the following are equivalent.
Γ ⊢
1
M : 〈D〉[T ]
Γ ⊢
1
M : 〈D ⊓A〉[T ]
(t-sub)
Γ ⊢
1
↓A(M) : 〈D〉[T ]
(t-mod-*)
Γ ⊢
1
M : 〈D〉[T ]
Γ ⊢
1
↓A(M) : 〈D〉[T ]
(t-mod-dn) 
Example 17 (A sublanguage). The following proper sublanguage is suient to enode the
omputational lambda alulus. Here values and terms are disjoint, with values assigned
value types T and terms assigned omputation types 〈A〉[T ].
T, S ::= Base | T  〈A〉[S] | {A}[T ]
V,U,W ::= bv | x | λx.M | {A}[V ℄
M,N,L ::= [V ℄ | V U | fix V | check V | let x=M;N | ρ(M)
Enoding the Churh Booleans in this sublanguage is slightly more ompliated than in
Example 14; tru and fls must aept thunks of type Unit 〈A〉[S] rather than the simpler
bloks of type 〈A〉[S].
Operations on base values that have no omputational eet are plaed in the language
of values rather than the language of terms. The resulting terms may be simplied at any
time without aeting the omputation (e.g., [1+2 == 3℄ may be simplied to [tru℄).
Example 18 (Relation to onferene version). The language presented here is muh simpler
than that of the onferene version of this paper [14℄. In partiular, the onferene version
ollapsed guards and abstrations into a single form {A}[λx.M℄ with types of the form
T  {A ⊲ B}[S], whih translates here as {A}
[
T  〈B〉[S]
]
: the immediate guard of the
abstration is A, whereas the eet of applying the abstration is B.
In addition, the onferene version ollapsed role modiation and appliation: the
appliation ↓C V U rst heked the guard of V , then performed the appliation in a
ontext modied by ↓C. In the urrent presentation, this translates as  let x= check V ;
↓C(x U).
4. Examples
In this setion we assume nullary role onstrutors for user roles, suh as Alice, Bob,
Charlie, Admin, and Daemon.
Example 19 (ACLs). Consider a read-only lesystem proteted by Aess Control Lists
(ACLs). One an model suh a system as:
filesystem
△
= λname. if name=="file1" then check {Admin}["data1"℄
else if name=="file2" then check {Alice ⊓ Bob}["data2"℄
else ["error: file not found"℄
If Admin ≥ Alice ⊓ Bob then ode running in the Admin role an aess both les:
Admin ⊲ filesystem "file1"։ check {Admin}["data1"℄։ ["data1"℄
Admin ⊲ filesystem "file2"։ check {Alice ⊓ Bob}["data2"℄։ ["data2"℄
If Alice 6≥ Admin then ode running as Alice annot aess the rst le but an aess the
seond:
Alice ⊲ filesystem "file1"։ check {Admin}["data1"℄  err
Alice ⊲ filesystem "file2"։ check {Alice ⊓ Bob}["data2"℄։ ["data2"℄
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Finally, if Charlie 6≥ Alice ⊓ Bob then ode running as Charlie annot aess either le:
Charlie ⊲ filesystem "file1"։ check {Admin}["data1"℄  err
Charlie ⊲ filesystem "file2"։ check {Alice ⊓ Bob}["data2"℄  err
The lesystem ode an be assigned the following type, meaning that a aller must
possess a role from eah of the ACLs in order to guarantee that aess heks will not fail.
If, in addition, Admin ≥ Alice ⊓ Bob then the nal role is equal to Admin.
⊢
1
filesystem : String 〈Admin ⊔ (Alice ⊓ Bob) ⊔ 0〉[String]
In the above type, the nal role 0 arises from the unknown le branh that does not require
an aess hek. The lak of an aess hek explains the weaker ⊢
2
type:
⊢
2
filesystem : String 〈Admin ⊓ (Alice ⊓ Bob) ⊓ 0〉[String]
This type indiates that filesystem has the potential to expose some information to unprivi-
leged allers with role Admin⊓ (Alice⊓Bob)⊓0
.
= 0, perhaps ausing the ode to be agged
for seurity review.
Example 20 (Web server). Consider a web server that provides remote aess to the lesys-
tem desribed above. The web server an use the role assigned to a aller to aess the
lesystem (unless the web server's aller withholds its role). To prevent an attaker deter-
mining the non-existene of les via the web server, the web server fails when an attempt is
made to aess an unknown le unless the Debug role is ativated.
webserver
△
= λname. if name=="file1" then filesystem name
else if name=="file2" then filesystem name
else check {Debug}["error: file not found"℄
For example, ode running as Alie an aess "file2" via the web server:
Alice ⊲ webserver "file2"։ filesystem "file2"։ ["data2"℄
The aess hek in the web server does prevent the le not found error message leaking
unless the Debug role is ative, but, unfortunately, it is not possible to assign a role stritly
greater than 0 to the web server using the seond type system. The filesystem type does not
reord the dierent roles that must be heked depending upon the lename argument.
⊢
2
webserver : String 〈Admin ⊓ (Alice ⊓ Bob) ⊓ 0〉[String] (derivable)
6⊢
2
webserver : String 〈Admin ⊓ (Alice ⊓ Bob) ⊓ Debug〉[String] (not derivable) 
Example 21 illustrates how the Domain-Type Enforement (dte) aess ontrol meha-
nism [6, 31℄, found in Seurity-Enhaned Linux (selinux) [17℄, an be modelled in λ-RBAC.
Further disussion of the relationship between rba and dte an be found in [11, 13℄.
Example 21 (Domain-Type Enforement). The dte aess ontrol mehanism grants or
denies aess requests aording to the urrent domain of running ode. The urrent domain
hanges as new programs are exeuted, and transitions between domains are restrited in
order to allow, and also fore, ode to run with an appropriate domain. The restritions upon
domain transitions are based upon a dte type assoiated with eah program to exeute. For
example, the dte poliy in [31℄ only permits transitions from a domain for daemon proesses
to a domain for login proesses when exeuting the login program, beause ode running in
the login domain is highly privileged. This eet is ahieved by allowing transitions from
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the daemon domain to the login domain only upon exeution of programs assoiated with
a partiular dte type, and that dte type is assigned only to the login program.
The essene of dte an be aptured in λ-RBAC, using roles to model both domains and
dte types, and the ontext role to model the urrent domain of a system. We start by
building upon the ode fragment λg.λy.B(g y), disussed in Example 7, that allows a
funtion heking role B to be exeuted in the ontext of ode running at a dierent role.
We have the typing (for emphasis we use extra parentheses that are not stritly neessary
given the usual right assoiativity for the funtion type onstrutor):
⊢α λg.λy.B(g y) : (T  〈B〉[S]) (T  〈0〉[S])
To aid readability, and xing types T and S for the remainder of this example, dene:
R △= R  (T  〈0〉[S])
So that the previous typing beomes:
⊢α λg.λy.B(g y) : T 〈B〉[S]
To restrit the use of the privileged funtion λg.λy.B(g y), it an be guarded by a role E
ating as a dte type, where the assoiation of the dte type E with a funtion is modelled
in the sequel by ode that an ativate role E. The guarded funtion an be typed as:
⊢α {E}[λg.λy.B(g y)℄ : {E}[T 〈B〉[S]]
We now dene a funtion domtrans<A, E, B> for a domain transition from domain (role)
A to domain (role) B upon exeution of a funtion assoiated with dte type (also a role)
E. The funtion rst veries that the ontext role dominates A, and then permits use
of the privileged funtion λg.λy.B(g y) by ode that an ativate role E. The funtion
domtrans<A, E, B> is dened by:
domtrans<A, E, B> △= λf.λx.check {A}[unit℄; f {E}[λg.λy.B(g y)℄ x
We have the typing:
⊢α domtrans<A, E, B> : {E}[T  〈B〉[S]] (T  〈A〉[S])
The above type shows that domtrans<A, E, B> an be used to turn a funtion heking role
B into a funtion heking role A, but only when the role E is availablein ontrast to the
type (T  〈B〉[S]) (T  〈A〉[S]) that does not require E.
In order to make use of domtrans<A, E, B>, we must also onsider ode that an ativate
E. We dene a funtion assign<E> that takes a funtion f and ativates E in order to aess
the privileged ode λg.λy.B(g y) from domtrans<A, E, B>. The funtion assign<E> is
dened by:
assign<E> △= λf.λx.λy. let g= E(check x);g f y
And we have the typing:
⊢α assign<E> : (T  〈B〉[S]) {E}[T  〈B〉[S]]
Therefore the funtional omposition of assign<E> and domtrans<A, E, B> has type:
(T  〈B〉[S]) (T  〈A〉[S])
To show that in the presene of both assign<E> and domtrans<A, E, B>, ode running with
ontext A an exeute ode heking for role ontext B, we onsider the following redutions
λ-RBAC: PROGRAMMING WITH ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL 17
in role ontext A, where we take F △= λz.check {B}[unit℄ and underline terms to indiate
the redex:
domtrans<A, E, B> (assign<E> F) unit
= (λf.λx.check {A}[unit℄; f ({E}[λg.λy.B(g y)℄) x) (assign<E> F) unit
→ (λx.check {A}[unit℄; (assign<E> F) ({E}[λg.λy.B(g y)℄) x) unit
→ check {A}[unit℄; (assign<E> F) ({E}[λg.λy.B(g y)℄) unit
→ (assign<E> F) ({E}[λg.λy.B(g y)℄) unit
=
(
(λf.λx.λy. let g= E(check x);g f y) F
)
({E}[λg.λy.B(g y)℄) unit
→ (λx.λy. let g= E(check x);g F y) ({E}[λg.λy.B(g y)℄) unit
→ (λy. let g= E(check {E}[λg.λy.B(g y)℄);g F y) unit
→ let g= E(check {E}[λg.λy.B(g y)℄);g F unit
→ let g= E([λg.λy.B(g y)℄);g F unit
։ let g= [λg.λy.B(g y)℄; g F unit
→ (λg.λy.B(g y)) F unit
→ (λy.B(F y)) unit
→ B(F unit)
= B((λz.check {B}[unit℄) unit)
→ B(check {B}[unit℄)
→ B([unit℄)
։ [unit℄
The strength of dte lies in the ability to fator aess ontrol poliies into two ompo-
nents: the set of permitted domain transitions and the assignment of dte types to ode.
We illustrate this by adapting the aforementioned login example from [31℄ to λ− RBAC. In
this example, the dte mehanism is used to fore every invoation of user ode (running
at role User) from daemon ode (running at role Daemon) to our via trusted login ode
(running at role Login). This is ahieved by providing domain transitions from Login to
User, and Daemon to Login, but no others. Moreover, ode permitted to run at Login must
be assigned dte type LoginEXE, and similarly for User and UserEXE. Thus a full program
running daemon ode M has the following form, where neither M nor N ontain diret rights
ampliation.
let dtLoginToUser= domtrans<Login, UserEXE, User>;
let dtDaemonToLogin= domtrans<Daemon, LoginEXE, Login>;
let shell= assign<UserEXE> (λ.M);
let login= assign<LoginEXE> (λpwd. if pwd=="seret" then dtLoginToUser shell unit else . . .);
Daemon(N)
Beause login provides the sole gateway to the role User, the daemon ode N must provide
the orret password in order to exeute the shell at User (in order to aess resoures that
are available at role User but not at role Daemon). In addition, removal of the domain
transition dtDaemonToLogin makes it impossible for the daemon ode to exeute any ode
at User.
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5. Controlling rights amplifiation
Example 22. Suppose that M ontains no diret rights ampliation, that is, no subterms
of the form ↑A( · ). Then, in
let priv= [λx.↑A(V x)℄; ↓User(M)
we may view V as a Trusted Computing Base (tb)  a privileged funtion whih may
esalate rights  and view M as restrited user ode. The funtion priv is an entry point to
the tb whih is aessible to user ode; that is, user ode is exeuted at the restrited role
User, and rights ampliation may only our through invoation of priv.
Non-trivial programs have larger tbs with more entry points. As the size of the tb
grows, it beomes diult to understand the seurity guarantees oered by a system when
rights ampliation is unonstrained, even if only in the tb. To manage this omplexity,
one may enfore a oding onvention that requires rights inreases be justied by earlier
heks. As an example, onsider the following, where amplify is a unary role onstrutor.
let at<A>= [λf.check {amplify(A)}[λx.↑A(f x)℄℄;
let priv= at<A> V;
↓User(M)
In a ontext with role amplify(A), this redues (using r-bind, r-app and r-hk) to
let priv= [λx.↑A(V x)℄; ↓User(M)
In a ontext without role amplify(A), evaluation beomes stuk when attempting to exeute
r-hk. The privileged funtion returned by at<A> (whih performs rights ampliation for
A) is justied by the hek for amplify(A) on any aller of at<A>.
One may also wish to expliitly prohibit a term from diret ampliation of some right
B; with suh a onvention in plae, this an be ahieved using the role modier ↓amplify(B).
One may formalize the preeding example by introduing the unary role onstrutor
amplify, where amplify(A) stands for the right to provide the role A by storing ↑A in ode.
We require that amplify distribute over ⊔ and ⊓ and obey the following absorption laws:
A ⊔ amplify(A)
.
= amplify(A) A ⊓ amplify(A)
.
= A
Thus amplify(A) > A for any role A.
To distinguish justied use of role modiers from unjustied use, we augment the syntax
with heked role modiers.
M,N ::= · · · | ρA(M)
Whenever a hek is performed on role M we mark role modiers in the onsequent to
indiate that these modiers have been justied by a hek. Dene the funtion markA
homomorphially over all terms but for role modiers:
markA(ρ(M)) = ρA(markA(M))
markA(ρB(M)) = ρA⊔B(markA(M))
Modify the redution rule for check as follows.
A ⊲ check {B}[M℄→ [markB(M)℄
A > B
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Thus, the hek in the example above will exeute as follows.
amplify(A) ⊲ check {amplify(A)}[λx.↑A(f x)℄→ λx.↑A
amplify(A)(f x)
In the residual, the abstration ontains a heked role modier, indiating that the role
ampliation has been provided by ode that had the right to do so.
We now dene role modiation errors so that ↑AB(M) produes an error if B does
not dominate amplify(A).
↑B(M)  moderr ↑BC(M)  moderr
C 6> amplify(B)
M  moderr
M N  moderr
M  moderr
let x=M;N  moderr
M  moderr
check M  moderr
M  moderr
ρ(M)  moderr
Using this augmented language, unjustied rights ampliation is noted as an error. To
prevent suh errors, we modify the typing system to have judgments of the form Γ;C ⊢α M :
T , where C indiates the aumulated guards on a term whih must be disharged before
the term may be exeuted; sine M is guarded by C, it may inlude subterms of the form
↑A( · ) when C > amplify(A). In addition to adding rules for heked role modiers, we
also modify t-grd and t-mod-up. The rule t-mod-up ensures that any ampliation is
justied by C. The rule t-grd allows guards to be used in heking guarded terms; the rule
is sound sine guarded terms must be heked before they are exeuted.
(t-grd
′
)
Γ;C ⊔A ⊢α M : T
Γ;C ⊢α {A}[M℄ : {A}[T ]
(t-mod-up
′
)
Γ;C ⊢α M : 〈B〉[T ]
Γ;C ⊢α ↑A(M) : 〈B ⊓A
⋆〉[T ]
C > amplify(A)
(t-mod-dn-heked)
Γ;C ⊢α M : 〈B〉[T ]
Γ;C ⊢α ↓AD(M) : 〈B〉[T ]
if α = 1
then A > B
(t-mod-up-heked)
Γ;C ⊢α M : 〈B〉[T ]
Γ;C ⊢α ↑AD(M) : 〈B ⊓A
⋆〉[T ]
C ⊔D > amplify(A)
One may not assume that top level terms have been guarded; therefore, let Γ ⊢α M : T be
shorthand for Γ;0 ⊢α M : T .
Example 23. The funtions domtrans and assign from Example 21 are not typable using
this more restritive system. Reall the denitions:
domtrans<A, E, B> △= λf.λx.check {A}[unit℄; f {E}[λg.λy.B(g y)℄ x
assign<E> △= λf.λx.λy. let g= E(check x);g f y
The ampliation of B in domtrans is not justied; neither is the ampliation of E in assign.
The required form is:
domtrans<A, E, B> △= {amplify(B)}[λf.λx.check {A}[unit℄; f {E}[λg.λy.B(g y)℄ x℄
assign<E> △= {amplify(E)}[λf.λx.λy. let g= E(check x);g f y℄
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The login example must now be modied in order to disharge the guards. Again the
modiations are straightforward:
let dtLoginToUser= check domtrans<Login, UserEXE, User>;
let dtDaemonToLogin= check domtrans<Daemon, LoginEXE, Login>;
let assignXUser= check assign<UserEXE>;
let assignXLogin= check assign<LoginEXE>;
let shell= assignXUser (λ.M);
let login= assignXLogin (λpwd. if pwd=="seret" then dtLoginToUser shell unit else . . .);
Daemon(N)
Thus modied, the program types orretly, but will only exeute in a ontext that dominates
the four roles amplify(User), amplify(UserEXE), amplify(Login), and amplify(LoginEXE).
This ensures that domain transitions and assignments are reated by authorized ode.
Proposition 25 establishes that the typing system is suient to prevent role modia-
tion errors. The proof of Proposition 25 relies on the following lemma, whih establishes the
relation between typing and mark .
Lemma 24. If Γ;C ⊔A ⊢α M : T then Γ;C ⊢α markA(M) : T .
Proof. By indution on the derivation of the typing judgment, appealing to the denition
of mark .
Proposition 25. If ⊢α M : T and A ⊲ M ։ N then ¬(N  moderr)
Proof Sketh. That ¬(M  moderr) follows immediately from the denition of role modi-
ation error, ombined with t-mod-up
′
and t-mod-up-heked. It remains only to show
that typing is preserved by redution. We prove this for the type systems of Setion 3 in
the next setion. The proof extends easily to the type system onsidered here. The only
wrinkle is the evaluation rule for check, whih is handled using the previous lemma.
6. Proof of Type Safety Theorems
The proofs for the rst and seond systems are similar, both relying on well-studied
tehniques [23℄. We present proofs for the seond system, whih is the more hallenging of
the two.
Denition 26 (Compatibility). Types T and S are ompatible (notation T ≈ S) if T = S
or T = 〈A〉[R] and S = 〈B〉[R], for some type R.
The following lemmas have straightforward indutive proofs.
Lemma 27 (Compatibility). If ⊢α T <: T
′
then T ≈ S i T ′ ≈ S.
Lemma 28 (Substitution). If Γ ⊢α M : T and Γ, x : T ⊢α N : S, then Γ ⊢α N{x := M} : S.
Lemma 29 (Bound Weakening). If Γ, x:S ⊢α M : T and ⊢α S
′
<
: S, then Γ, x : S′ ⊢α M : T .
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Lemma 30 (Canonial Forms).
(1) If ⊢
2
V : T  S then V has form (λx.M) where x:T ⊢
2
M : S.
(2) If ⊢
2
V : 〈A〉[T ] then V has form [M℄ where ⊢
2
M : T and A = 0.
(3) If ⊢
2
V : {A}[T ] then V has form {B}[M℄ where ⊢
2
M : T and B > A.
Proof.
(1) By indution on derivation of ⊢
2
V : T  S. The only appliable ases are t-sub and
t-abs.
(t-sub) We know ⊢
2
V : T ′S′, where ⊢
2
V : T S and ⊢
2
T S
<
: T ′S′, so ⊢
2
T ′
<
: T
and ⊢
2
S
<
: S′. By the IH, V has form (λx.M) where x:T ⊢
2
M : S. By Lemma 29
and subsumption, x:T ′ ⊢
2
M : S′.
(t-abs) Immediate.
(2) By indution on derivation of ⊢
2
V : 〈A〉[T ]. The only appliable ases are t-sub and
t-unit.
(t-sub) We know ⊢
2
V : 〈A′〉[T ′], where ⊢
2
V : 〈A〉[T ] and ⊢
2
〈A〉[T ]
<
: 〈A′〉[T ′], so
⊢
2
T
<
: T ′ and A > A′. By the IH, V has form [M℄ where ⊢
2
M : T and A = 0, so
A′ = 0. By subsumption, ⊢
2
M : T ′.
(t-unit) Immediate.
(3) By indution on derivation of ⊢
2
V : {A}[T ]. The only appliable ases are t-sub and
t-grd.
(t-sub) We know ⊢
2
V : {A′}[T ′], where ⊢
2
V : {A}[T ] and ⊢
2
{A}[T ]
<
: {A′}[T ′], so
⊢
2
T
<
: T ′ and A > A′. By the IH, V has form {B}[M℄ where ⊢
2
M : T and B > A,
so B > A′. By subsumption, ⊢
2
M : T ′.
(t-grd) Immediate.
Proposition 31 (Preservation). If ⊢
2
M : T and A ⊲ M → N then there exists S suh that
S ≈ T and ⊢
2
N : S and if A ≥ S then A ≥ T .
Proof. By indution on the derivation of ⊢
2
M : T . The indution hypothesis inludes the
quantiation over A, N . For values, the result is trivial; thus we onsider only the rules for
non-values.
(t-sub) We know ⊢
2
M : T ′, where ⊢
2
M : T and ⊢
2
T
<
: T ′, and A ⊲ M → N . Applying the
IH to ⊢
2
M : T and A ⊲ M → N yields S suh that ⊢
2
N : S and S ≈ T and if A ≥ S
then A ≥ T . By Lemma 10, this extends to if A ≥ S then A ≥ T ′. In addition, by
Lemma 27, we have S ≈ T ′.
(t-app) We know ⊢
2
M N : T
2
, where ⊢
2
M : T
1
 T
2
and ⊢
2
N : T
1
, and A ⊲ M N → L.
There are two subases depending on the redution rule used in A ⊲ M N → L.
(M is a value) By Lemma 30, M = λx.M ′ and x:T
1
⊢
2
M ′ : T
2
. The redution yields
L = M ′{x := N}. By Lemma 28, ⊢
2
L : T
2
. The remaining requirements on T
2
are
immediate.
(M has a redution) Therefore A ⊲ M → M ′ and L = M ′ N . Applying the IH to
⊢
2
M : T
1
T
2
and A ⊲ M →M ′ yields S suh that ⊢
2
M ′ : S and S ≈ T
1
T
2
, whih
implies that S = T
1
 T
2
. Hene ⊢
2
L : T
2
. The remaining requirements on T
2
are
immediate.
(t-fix) We know ⊢
2
fix M : T , where ⊢
2
M : T  T and A ⊲ fix M → L. There are two
subases depending on the redution rule used in A ⊲ fixM → L.
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(M is a value) By Lemma 30, M = λx.M ′ and x:T ⊢
2
M ′ : T . The redution yields
L = M ′{x :=M}. By Lemma 28, ⊢
2
L : T . The remaining requirements on T are
immediate.
(M has a redution) Therefore A ⊲ M → M ′ and L = fix M ′. Applying the IH to
⊢
2
M : T  T and A ⊲ M → M ′ yields S suh that ⊢
2
M ′ : S and S ≈ T  T , whih
implies that S = T  T . Hene ⊢
2
L : T . The remaining requirements on T are
immediate.
(t-hk) We know ⊢
2
check M : 〈A
1
〉[T ], where ⊢
2
M : {A
1
}[T ], and A ⊲ check M → L.
There are two subases depending on the redution rule used in A ⊲ check M → L.
(M is a value) By Lemma 30, M = {A
2
}[M ′℄ and ⊢
2
M ′ : T and A
2
> A
1
. The
redution yields L = [M ′℄ and from the redution we dedue A > A
2
, so A > A
1
always holds. We assign type ⊢
2
L : 〈0〉[T ], where 〈0〉[T ] ≈ 〈A
1
〉[T ], and we have
already shown that A > 0 implies A > A
1
.
(M has a redution) Therefore A ⊲ M → M ′ and L = check M ′. Applying the IH to
⊢
2
M : {A
1
}[T ] and A ⊲ M → M ′ yields S suh that ⊢
2
M ′ : S and S ≈ {A
1
}[T ],
so S = {A
1
}[T ]. Hene ⊢
2
L : 〈A
1
〉[T ]. The remaining requirements on 〈A
1
〉[T ] are
immediate.
(t-bind) We know ⊢
2
let x=M;N : 〈A
1
⊔ A
2
〉[T
2
], where ⊢
2
M : 〈A
1
〉[T
1
] and x:T
1
⊢
2
N :
〈A
2
〉[T
2
], and A ⊲ let x=M;N → L. There are two subases depending on the redution
rule used in A ⊲ let x=M;N → L.
(M is a value) By Lemma 30, M = [M ′℄ and ⊢
2
M ′ : T
1
and A
1
= 0, so A
1
⊔A
2
= A
2
.
The redution yields L = N{x :=M ′}. By Lemma 28, ⊢
2
L : 〈A
2
〉[T
2
]. The remaining
requirements on T
2
are immediate.
(M has a redution) Therefore A ⊲ M → M ′ and L = let x=M ′;N . Applying the IH
to ⊢
2
M : 〈A
1
〉[T
1
] and A ⊲ M → M ′ yields S suh that ⊢
2
M ′ : S and S ≈ 〈A
1
〉[T
1
]
and if A ≥ S then A ≥ 〈A
1
〉[T
1
]. Hene S = 〈A
3
〉[T
1
], for some A
3
, and A > A
3
implies A > A
1
. We dedue ⊢
2
L : 〈A
3
⊔A
2
〉[T
2
], where 〈A
3
⊔A
2
〉[T
2
] ≈ 〈A
1
⊔A
2
〉[T
2
].
Finally, suppose A ≥ 〈A
3
⊔ A
2
〉[T
2
], i.e., A > A
3
⊔ A
2
, so A > A
3
and A > A
2
. By
the above, this entails A > A
1
, so A > A
1
⊔ A
2
. Therefore A ≥ 〈A
1
⊔ A
2
〉[T
2
], as
required.
(t-mod-up) We know ⊢
2
↑A
1
(M) : 〈A
2
⊓A⋆
1
〉[T ], where ⊢
2
M : 〈A
2
〉[T ], and A ⊲ ↑A
1
(M)→
L. There are two subases depending on the redution rule used in A ⊲ ↑A
1
(M)→ L.
(M is a value) Therefore L = M and ⊢
2
L : 〈A
2
〉[T ], where 〈A
2
〉[T ] ≈ 〈A
2
⊓ A⋆
1
〉[T ]. By
Lemma 30, M = [M ′℄ and ⊢
2
M ′ : T and A
2
= 0, and the remaining requirement on
〈A
2
〉[T ], that A ≥ 〈A
2
〉[T ] implies A ≥ 〈A
2
⊓A⋆
1
〉[T ], is immediate.
(M has a redution) Therefore ↑A
1
LA M ⊲ M → M ′ and L = ↑A
1
(M ′). Applying the
IH to ⊢
2
M : 〈A
2
〉[T ] and ↑A
1
LA M ⊲ M → M ′ yields S suh that ⊢
2
M ′ : S and S ≈
〈A
2
〉[T ], so S = 〈A
3
〉[T ] for some A
3
, and if ↑A
1
LA M ≥ S then ↑A
1
LA M ≥ 〈A
2
〉[T ],
i.e., A ⊔ A
1
> A
3
implies A ⊔ A
1
> A
2
. We have ⊢
2
↑A
1
(M ′) : 〈A
3
⊓ A⋆
1
〉[T ] and
〈A
3
⊓ A⋆
1
〉[T ] ≈ 〈A
2
⊓ A⋆
1
〉[T ]. Finally, if A ≥ 〈A
3
⊓ A⋆
1
〉[T ], then A > A
3
⊓ A⋆
1
, so
A ⊔ A
1
> (A
3
⊓ A⋆
1
) ⊔ A
1
= (A
3
⊔ A
1
) ⊓ 1 = A
3
⊔ A
1
. Hene A ⊔ A
1
> A
3
, so
A ⊔ A
1
> A
2
, and A ⊓ A⋆
1
= (A ⊓ A⋆
1
) ⊔ 0 = (A ⊔ A
1
) ⊓ A⋆
1
> A
2
⊓ A⋆
1
. Therefore
A > A
2
⊓A⋆
1
and A ≥ 〈A
2
⊓A⋆
1
〉[T ], as required.
(t-mod-dn) We know ⊢
2
↓A
1
(M) : 〈A
2
〉[T ], where ⊢
2
M : 〈A
2
〉[T ], and A ⊲ ↓A
1
(M) → L.
There are two subases depending on the redution rule used in A ⊲ ↓A
1
(M)→ L.
(M is a value) Therefore L = M and ⊢
2
L : 〈A
2
〉[T ], and we are done.
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(M has a redution) Therefore ↓A
1
LA M ⊲ M →M ′ and L = ↓A
1
(M ′). By A > ↓A
1
LA M
and Lemma 4, we have A ⊲ M → M ′. Applying the IH to ⊢
2
M : 〈A
2
〉[T ] and
A ⊲ M →M ′ yields S suh that ⊢
2
M ′ : S and S ≈ 〈A
2
〉[T ], so S = 〈A
3
〉[T ] for some
A
3
, and if A ≥ S then A ≥ 〈A
2
〉[T ]. Hene ⊢
2
↓A
1
(M ′) : 〈A
3
〉[T ], whih ompletes
the subase.
Corollary 32. If ⊢
2
M : T and A ⊲ M ։ V , then A ≥ T .
Proof. By indution on the length of the redution sequene A ⊲ M ։ V . For the base
ase, M = V and Lemma 30 implies that A ≥ T , beause every non-omputation type
is dominated by any role, and in a omputation type T = 〈B〉[S] Lemma 30 tells us that
B = 0. For the indutive step, there exists N suh that A ⊲ M → N and A ⊲ N ։ V . By
Proposition 31, there exists S suh that ⊢
2
N : S and if A ≥ S then A ≥ T . Applying the
IH to ⊢
2
N : S and A ⊲ N ։ V yields A ≥ S, hene A ≥ T as required.
Proposition 33 (Progress). For all A, if ⊢
2
M : T then either M is a value, A ⊲ M  err,
or there exists N suh that A ⊲ M → N .
Proof. By indution on the derivation of ⊢
2
M : T . We need only onsider the ases when
M is not a value.
(t-sub) We know ⊢
2
M : T ′, where ⊢
2
M : T and ⊢
2
T
<
: T ′. Immediate by the IH.
(t-app) We know ⊢
2
M N : T
2
, where ⊢
2
M : T
1
 T
2
and ⊢
2
N : T
1
. Apply the IH to
⊢
2
M : T
1
 T
2
and role A. If M is a value, then, by Lemma 30, M has form (λx.L), so
A ⊲ M N → L{x := N}. If A ⊲ M  err, then A ⊲ M N  err. Finally, if A ⊲ M → L,
then A ⊲ M N → L N .
(t-fix) We know ⊢
2
fixM : T , where ⊢
2
M : TT . Apply the IH to ⊢
2
M : TT and role A.
IfM is a value, then, by Lemma 30,M has form (λx.L), so A ⊲ fixM → L{x := (λx.L)}.
If A ⊲ M  err, then A ⊲ fixM  err. Finally, if A ⊲ M → L, then A ⊲ fixM → fix L.
(t-hk) We know ⊢
2
check M : 〈A
1
〉[T ], where ⊢
2
M : {A
1
}[T ]. Apply the IH to ⊢
2
M :
{A
1
}[T ] and role A. If M is a value, then, by Lemma 30, there exists B, L suh that
M = {B}[L℄, so either A ⊲ check M → [L℄ or A ⊲ check M  err depending on whether
A > B holds or not. If A ⊲ M  err, then A ⊲ check M  err. Finally, if A ⊲ M → L,
then A ⊲ check M → check L.
(t-bind) We know ⊢
2
let x= M;N : 〈A
1
⊔ A
2
〉[T
2
], where ⊢
2
M : 〈A
1
〉[T
1
] and x:T
1
⊢
2
N : 〈A
2
〉[T
2
]. Apply the IH to ⊢
2
M : 〈A
1
〉[T
1
] and role A. If M is a value, then, by
Lemma 30, M has form [L℄, so A ⊲ let x=M;N → N{x := L}. If A ⊲ M  err, then
A ⊲ let x=M;N  err. Finally, if A ⊲ M → L, then A ⊲ let x=M;N → let x= L;N .
(t-mod-up) We know ⊢
2
↑A
1
(M) : 〈A
2
⊓ A⋆
1
〉[T ], where ⊢
2
M : 〈A
2
〉[T ]. Apply the IH
to ⊢
2
M : 〈A
2
〉[T ] and role ↑A
1
LA M. If M is a value, then A ⊲ ↑A
1
(M) → M . If
↑A
1
LA M ⊲ M  err, then A ⊲ ↑A
1
(M)  err. Finally, if ↑A
1
LA M ⊲ M → L, then
A ⊲ ↑A
1
(M) → ↑A
1
(L).
(t-mod-dn) We know ⊢
2
↓A
1
(M) : 〈A
2
〉[T ], where ⊢
2
M : 〈A
2
〉[T ]. Apply the IH to
⊢
2
M : 〈A
2
〉[T ] and role ↓A
1
LA M. If M is a value, then A ⊲ ↓A
1
(M) → M . If
↓A
1
LA M ⊲ M  err, then A ⊲ ↓A
1
(M)  err. Finally, if ↓A
1
LA M ⊲ M → L, then
A ⊲ ↓A
1
(M) → ↓A
1
(L).
Theorem (12). If ⊢
2
M : T and A 6≥ T , then either A ⊲ M →ω or there exists N suh that
A ⊲ M ։ N and A ⊲ N  err.
Proof. We use a oindutive argument to onstrut a redution sequene that is either innite
or terminates with a role hek failure. When ⊢
2
M : T and A 6≥ T , we know that M is
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not a value by Lemma 30. By Proposition 33, either A ⊲ M  err or there exists N suh
that A ⊲ M → N . In the former ase, we are done. In the latter ase, using Proposition 31,
there exists S suh that ⊢
2
N : S and if A ≥ S then A ≥ T . However, we know that A 6≥ T ,
so A 6≥ S, as required.
7. Conlusions
The fous of this paper is programmati approahes, suh as jaas/.net, that use rba.
From a software engineering approah to the design of omponents, rba failitates a sepa-
ration of onerns: the design of the system is arried out in terms of a role hierarhy with
an assoiated assignment of permissions to roles, whereas the atual assignment of users to
roles takes plae at the time of deployment.
We have presented two methods to aid the design and use of omponents that inlude
suh aess ontrol ode. The rst  admittedly standard  tehnique enables users of
ode to dedue the role at whih ode must be run. The main use of this analysis is to
optimize ode by enabling the removal of some dynami heks. The seond  somewhat
more novel  analysis alulates the role that is veried on all exeution paths. This
analysis is potentially useful in validating arhitetural seurity requirements by enabling
ode designers to dedue the protetion guarantees of their ode.
We have demonstrated the use of these methods by modeling Domain Type Enfore-
ment, as used in SELinux. As future work, we will explore extensions to role polymorphism
and reursive roles following the tehniques of [8, 4℄.
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